COPY
CONFIDENTIAL.
1.
Report by Mr. P.BIAU, Technical Councillor of the
Government of French Equitorial Africa, on
leave in Hong Kong.
69
I arrived in Hong Kong by C.N.A.C. aircraft from Fort Lamy on December 2nd at 2 o'clock in the morning on three months leave, (for personal reasons). I was still in Hong Kong when it was attacked by the Japanese and during the seige I. served, at my own request, at No. 1 Depot, Rescue and Demolition Squad. I was thus able to observe how the Civil Passive Defence Organisation 01 Hong Kong worked and the effectiveness of the different Branches belonging to it. I am bound to say that of the 6 essential services only three were efficient. These were:- (a) Fire Service (b) The Ambulance Service (St. John's Ambulance Brigade) (c) the Rescue and Demolition Squad. three others, (a) Police and Police Reserve (b) A.R.P. (c) Food Control, were inefficient beyond description.
2.
Police.
•
The
•
Many of the European police officials, officers included, were frequently drunk, showed no sign of initiative or co-ordination, repeated rumours and took no action to enforce discipline. For example, during the day of December 13th I was sent with a squad of coolies to rescue some Chinese who were buried under the ruins of a house which a 50 kilogram. bomb had completely destroyed. From under a pile of bodies of men and women I was able to pull out a male child of about 15 months who was suffering from no external wounds; an officer of the Police Reserve (a Russian) took the child out of my hands and shot it dead with a revolver. I protested and he replied that there were already too many Chinese and that at.. least would make one less. I made a report to sub-Inspector Tylor attached to our Depot who replied that the child was already mutilated.
3.
Another example. A launch manned by police volunteers and by engineers and architects of the P.W.D. coming across from Stonecutter loaded with 12 tons of dynamite was fired.upon and caught fire and blew up with terrific force on the night of December 13th. The sentries who fired on the launch had not been advised by the policę authorities and as a result 14 British lives were lost.
4.
A.R.P.
.
'
The A.R.P. whose Central District Headquarters were at Dina House, also worked very badly. The head wardens never came near the place and allowed the Chinese wardens to send in· their reports which 9 times out of 10 were exaggerated. These wardens went to shelters immediately the bombardment started and telephoned their reports from the shelters without ever examining the damage. No wardens were ever seen during the whole of the bombardment, both European and Chinese remaining in shelters.
5.
Food Control.
The Food Control Bureau was run by youths and young girls,
They only sons and daughters of a few Government officials, looked after their families and relatives and the distribution * was extremely badly organised. There was no control and complete disorder.
6.
On the contrary, the Fire Services, both European and Chinese were very brave and energetic, working calmly under bombardment which, however, I should say was never very heavy.
Bombs
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